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Abstract
Recent advances in neural networks for content generation enable artificial intelligence (AI)
models to generate high-quality media manipulations. Here we report on a randomized experiment
designed to study the effect of exposure to media manipulations on over 15,000 individuals’
ability to discern machine-manipulated media. We engineer a neural network to plausibly and
automatically remove objects from images, and we deploy this neural network online with a
randomized experiment where participants can guess which image out of a pair of images has been
manipulated. The system provides participants feedback on the accuracy of each guess. In the
experiment, we randomize the order in which images are presented, allowing causal identification
of the learning curve surrounding participants’ ability to detect fake content. We find sizable and
robust evidence that individuals learn to detect fake content through exposure to manipulated
media when provided iterative feedback on their detection attempts. Over a succession of only
ten images, participants increase their rating accuracy by over ten percentage points. Our study
provides initial evidence that human ability to detect fake, machine-generated content may increase
alongside the prevalence of such media online.
Introduction
The recent emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) powered media manipulations has widespread societal
implications for journalism and democracy [1], national security [2], and art [3]. AI models have the potential to
scale misinformation to unprecedented levels by creating various forms of synthetic media [4]. For example, AI
systems can synthesize realistic video portraits of an individual with full control of facial expressions including
eye and lip movement [5–9], can clone a speaker’s voice with few training samples and generate new natural
sounding audio of something the speaker never previously said [10], can synthesize visually indicated sound
effects [11], can generate high quality, relevant text based on an initial prompt [12], can produce photorealistic
images of a variety of objects from text inputs [13–15], and can generate photorealistic videos of people expressing
emotions from only a single image [16, 17]. The technologies for producing entirely machine-generated, fake
media online are rapidly outpacing the ability to manually detect and respond to such media.
Media manipulation and misinformation are topics of considerable interest within the computational and social
sciences [18–21], partially because of their historical significance. For a particular kind of media manipulation,
there’s a Latin term, damnatio memoriae, which refers to the erasure of an individual from official accounts, often
in service of dominant political agendas. The earliest known instances of damnatio memoriae were discovered
in ancient Egyptian artifacts and similar patterns of removal have appeared since [22,23]. Figure SI8 presents
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iconic examples of damnatio memoriae throughout modern history. Historically, visual and audio manipulations
required both skilled experts and a significant investment of time and resources. Today, an AI model can produce
photorealistic manipulations nearly instantaneously, which magnifies the potential scale of misinformation. This
growing capability calls for understanding individuals’ abilities to differentiate between real and fake content.
To interrogate these questions directly, we engineer an AI system for photorealistic image manipulation and
host the model and its outputs online as an experiment to study participants’ abilities to differentiate between
unmodified and manipulated images. Our AI system consists of an end-to-end neural network architecture that
can plausibly disappear objects from images. For example, consider an image of a boat sailing on the ocean.
The AI model detects the boat, removes the boat, and replaces the boat’s pixels with pixels that approximate
what the ocean might have looked like without the boat present. Figure 1 presents four examples of participant
submitted images and their transformations. We host this AI model and its image outputs on a custom-designed
website called Deep Angel. Since Deep Angel launched in August 2018, over 110,000 individuals have visited
the website and interacted with the model and its outputs. Within the Deep Angel platform, we embedded a
randomized experiment to examine how repeated exposure to machine-manipulated images affects individuals’
ability to accurately identify manipulated imagery.
Figure 1: Examples of original images on the top row and manipulated images on the bottom row.
Experimental Design
User Interface
In the “Detect Fakes” feature on Deep Angel, individuals are presented with two images and asked a single
question: “Which image has something removed by Deep Angel?” See Figure 7 in the Supplementary Information
for a screenshot of this interaction. One image has an object removed by our AI model. The other image is
an unaltered image from the 2014 MS-COCO data [24]. After a participant answers the question by selecting
an image, the manipulated image is revealed to the participant and the participant is offered the option to try
again on a new pair of images.
Usage
Most participants interacted with “Detect Fakes” multiple times; the interquartile range of the number of guesses
per participant is from 3 to 18 with a median of 8. Each interaction followed the same randomization with
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Figure 2: (a) Histogram of mean identification accuracies by participants per image (b) Bar chart plotting
number of individuals over image position.
replacement, which ensured that the images displayed did not depend on what the individual had previously
seen.
From August 2018 to May 2019, 242,216 guesses were submitted from 16,542 unique IP addresses with a
mean identification accuracy of 86%. Deep Angel did not require participant sign-in, so we study participant
behavior under the assumption that each IP address represents a single individual. 7,576 participants submitted
at least 10 guesses. Each image appears as the first image an average of 35 times and the tenth image an average
of 15 times. In the sample of participants who saw at least ten images, the mean percentage correct classification
is 78% on the first image seen and 88% on the tenth image seen. The majority of manipulated images were
identified correctly more than 90% of the time. Figure 2a shows the distribution of identification accuracy over
images, and Figure 2b shows the distribution of image positions seen over participants.
By plotting participant identification accuracy against the order in which participants see images, Figure
3a reveals a logarithmic relationship between accuracy and overall exposure to manipulated images. Accuracy
increases fairly linearly over the first ten images after which accuracy plateaus around 88%.
Randomization
We randomly select the “Detect Fakes” images from two samples of images. One sample contains 440 images
manipulated by Deep Angel that participants submitted to be shared publicly. The other pool of images contains
5,008 images from the MS-COCO dataset [24]. Such randomization at the image dyad level is equivalent to
randomization of the image position - the order in which images appear to the participant. Based on the
randomized image position, we can causally evaluate the effect of image position on rating accuracy. We test the
causal effects with the following linear probability models:
yi,j = αXi,j + β log(Tin) + µi + νj + i,j (1)
and
yi,j = αXi,j + β1Ti1 + β2Ti2 + β3Ti3 + ...+ β9Ti9 + β10Ti10 + µi + νj + i,j (2)
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Figure 3: Participants’ overall and marginal accuracy by image order with error bars showing a 95% confidence
interval for each image position – (a) overall accuracy for all users with no fixed effects (b) marginal accuracy
(relative to the first image position) for all users who saw at least 10 images controlling for user and image fixed
effects and clustering errors at the image level. In (b), the 11th position includes all images positions beyond the
10th.
where yi,j is the binary accuracy (correct or incorrect guess) of participant j on manipulated image i. Xi,j
represents a matrix of covariates, Tin represents the order n in which manipulated image i appears to participant
j, µi represents the manipulated image fixed effects, νj represents the participant fixed effects, and i,j represents
the error term. The first model fits a logarithmic transformation of Tin to yi,j . The second model estimates
treatment effects separately for each image position. Both models use Huber-White (robust) standard errors,
and errors are clustered at the image level.
Results
With 242,216 observations, we run an ordinary least squares regression with user and image fixed effects on the
likelihood of guessing the manipulated image correctly. The results of these regressions are presented in Tables 1
and 2 in the Appendix. Each column in Table 1 and 2 adds an incremental filter to offer a series of robustness
checks. The first column shows all observations. The second column drops all users who submitted fewer than
10 guesses and removes all control images where nothing was removed. The third column drops all observations
where a user has already seen a particular image. The fourth column drops all images qualitatively judged as
below very high quality.
Across all four robustness checks with and without fixed-effects, our models show a positive and statistically
significant relationship between Tn and yˆi,j . In the linear-log model, a one unit increase in log(Tin) is associated
with a 3 percentage point increase in yˆi,j . In the model that estimates Equation 2, we find a 1 percentage point
average marginal treatment effect size of image position on yˆi,j . In other words, users improve their ability to
guess by 1 percentage point for each of the first 10 guesses. Figure 3 shows these results graphically.
We find little evidence of heterogeneous effects of the manipulation quality on the learning rate. Retrospectively,
we rated each image’s manipulation as high or low quality based on whether large and noticeable artifacts were
created by the image manipulation. While participants are better at identifying low quality manipulations than
high quality manipulations, we find statistically significant differences in the learning rates in only 3 of 10 image
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous effects on accuracy by participants who saw at least 10 images from (a) independent
manipulation rating and (b) position of first correct guess while controlling for user and image fixed effects. In (b),
the omitted position for each learning curve represents perfect accuracy. The marginal effects of subsequent image
positions are negative relative to these omitted image positions. The error bars represent the 95% confidence
interval for each image position and errors are clustered by images.
positions. These results are displayed in Figure 4a and indicate that the main effect is not simply driven by
participants becoming proficient at guessing low-quality images in our data.
We do not find lasting heterogeneous effects on the learning rate based on participants initial accuracy. In
Figure 4b, we compare subsequent learning rates of participants who correctly identified a manipulation on their
first attempt to participants who failed on their first attempt and succeeded on their second. In this comparison,
the omitted position for each learning curve represents perfect accuracy, which makes the marginal effects of
subsequent image positions negative relative to these omitted image positions. On the first 3 of 4 image positions
in this comparison, which correspond to the 3rd through 6th image positions, we find that initially successful
participants perform statistically better than initially unsuccessful participants. However, this heterogeneous
effect does not persist in subsequent image positions. In an additional test for heterogeneous treatment effects
based on the number of images beyond the first ten that participants saw, we do not find a statistically significant
differences in accuracy rates.
The statistically significant improvement in accurately identifying manipulations suggests that within the
context of Deep Angel, exposure to media manipulation and feedback on what has been manipulated can
successfully prepare individuals to detect faked media. When trained for 1 minute and 14 seconds on average,
across ten images, participants improved ability to detect manipulations by ten percentage points. As users are
exposed to image manipulations on Deep Angel, they quickly learn to spot the vast majority of the manipulations.
Discussion
While AI models can improve clinical diagnoses [25–27] and bring about autonomous driving [28], they also have
the potential to scale censorship [29], amplify polarization [30], and spread both fake news [18] and manipulated
media. We present results from a large scale randomized experiment that show the combination of exposure
to manipulated media and feedback on what media has been manipulated improves individuals’ ability to
detect media manipulations. Direct interaction with cutting edge technologies for content creation might enable
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more discerning media consumption across society. In practice, the news media has exposed high-profile AI
manipulated media including fake videos of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and
the CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, which serves as feedback to everyone on what manipulations look
like [31, 32]. Our results build on recent research that suggests human intuition can be a reliable source of
information about adversarial perturbations to images [33] and recent research that provides evidence that
familiarising people with how fake news is produced may confer cognitive immunity to people when they are
later exposed to misinformation [34].
The generalizability of our results is limited to the images produced by our AI model, and a promising avenue
for future research could expand the domains and models studied. Likewise, future research could explore to
what degree individuals’ ability to adaptively detect manipulated media comes from learning-by-doing, direct
feedback, and awareness that anything is manipulated at all.
Our results suggest a need to re-examine the precautionary principle that is commonly applied to content
generation technologies. In 2018, Google published BigGAN, which can generate realistic appearing objects in
images, but while they hosted the generator for anyone to explore, they explicitly withheld the discriminator
for their model [14]. Similarly, OpenAI restricted access to their GPT-2 model, which can generate plausible
long-form stories given an initial text prompt, by only providing a pared down model of GPT-2 trained with
fewer parameters [12]. If exposure to manipulated content can vaccinate people from future manipulations,
then censoring dissemination of AI research on content generation may prove harmful to society by leaving it
unprepared for a future of ubiquitous AI-mediated content.
Methods
We engineered a Target Object Removal pipeline to remove objects in images and replace those objects with
a plausible background. We combine a convolutional neural network (CNN) trained to detect objects with a
generative adversarial network (GAN) trained to inpaint missing pixels in an image [35–38]. Specifically, we
generate object masks with a CNN based on a RoIAlign bilinear interpolation on nearby points in the feature
map [37]. We crop the object masks from the image and apply a generative inpainting architecture to fill in
the object masks [39,40]. The generative inpainting architecture is based on dilated CNNs with an adversarial
loss function which allows the generative inpainting architecture to learn semantic information from large scale
datasets and generate missing content that makes contextual sense in the masked portion of the image [40].
Target Object Removal Pipeline
Our end-to-end targeted object removal pipeline consists of three interfacing neural networks:
• Object Mask Generator (G): This network creates a segmentation mask Xˆ = G(X, y) given an input
image X and a target class y. In our experiments, we initialize G from a semantic segmentation network
trained on the 2014 MS-COCO dataset following the Mask-RCNN algorithm [37]. The network generates
masks for all object classes present in an image, and we select only the correct masks based on input y.
This network was trained on 60 object classes.
• Generative Inpainter (I): This network creates an inpainted version Z = I(Xˆ,X) of the input image
X and the object mask Xˆ. I is initialized following the DeepFill algorithm trained on the MIT Places 2
dataset [40,41].
• Local Discriminator (D): The final discriminator network takes in the inpainted image and determines
the validity of the image. Following the training of a GAN discriminator, D is trained simultaneously on I
where X are images from the MIT Places 2 dataset and Xˆ are the same images with randomly assigned
holes following [40,41].
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For every input image and class label pair, we first generate an object mask using G, which is paired with the
image and inputted to the inpainting network I that produces the generated image. The inpainter is trained
from the loss of the discriminator D, following the typical GAN pipeline. An illustration of our neural network
architecture is provided in Figure 5.
Live Deployment
We designed an interactive website called Deep Angel to make the Target Object Removal pipeline publicly
available.1 The API for the Target Object Removal pipeline is served by a single Nvidia Geforce GTX Titan X.
In addition to the “Detect Fakes” user interaction, Deep Angel has a user interaction “Erase with AI,” where
people can apply the Target Object Removal pipeline on their own images. See Figure 6 for a screen shot of this
user interface.
In “Erase with AI,” people first select a category of object that they seek to remove and then they either
upload an image or select an Instagram account from which to upload the three most recent images. After
the user submits his or her selections, Deep Angel returns both the original image and a transformation of the
original image with the selected objects removed.
Users uploaded 18,152 unique images from mobile phones and computers. In addition, user directed the
crawling of 12,580 unique images from Instagram. The most frequently selected objects for removal are displayed
in Table SI3. The overwhelming majority of images uploaded and Instagram accounts selected were unique. 88%
of the usernames entered for targeted Instagram crawls were unique.
We can surface the most plausible object removal manipulations by examining the images with the lowest
guessing accuracy. Ultimately, plausible manipulations are relatively rare and image dependent.
The Target Object Removal model can produce plausible content but it is not perfect. For the Target Object
Removal model, plausible manipulations are confined to specific domains. Objects are only plausibly removed
when they are a small portion of the image and the background is natural and uncluttered by other objects.
Likewise, the model often generates model-specific artifacts that humans can learn to detect.
Acknowledgments: We thank Abhimanyu Dubey, Mohit Tiwari, and David McKenzie for their helpful
comments and feedback.
Author contributions: M.G. implemented the methods, M.G., Z.E., N.O. analyzed data and wrote the paper.
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Appendix I: Regression Tables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Image Position) 0.0261*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0255***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0029)
N 242216 192665 172434 55692
Mean Accuracy on 1st Image 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.74
Mean Accuracy on 10th Image 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.83
R2 0.29 0.19 0.20 0.26
Table 1: Ordinary least squares regression with user and image fixed effects evaluating image position on users’
accuracy in identifying manipulated images. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical
significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence intervals, respectively. All columns include user and image
fixed effects. Column (1) includes all images (2) drops all users who submitted fewer than 10 guesses and
removes all control images where nothing was removed (3) drops all observations where a user has already seen a
particular image (4) keeps only the images qualitatively judged as very high quality.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd 0.0507*** 0.0569*** 0.0571*** 0.0378***
(0.0042) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0131)
3rd 0.0672*** 0.0744*** 0.0746*** 0.0454***
(0.0048) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0123)
4th 0.0775*** 0.0888*** 0.0885*** 0.0686***
(0.0050) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0121)
5th 0.0859*** 0.0978*** 0.0967*** 0.0749***
(0.0052) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0129)
6th 0.0817*** 0.0962*** 0.0963*** 0.0613***
(0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0130)
7th 0.0900*** 0.1032*** 0.1039*** 0.0741***
(0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0134)
8th 0.1019*** 0.1120*** 0.1106*** 0.0904***
(0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0137)
9th 0.1028*** 0.1136*** 0.1134*** 0.0959***
(0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0142)
10th 0.1030*** 0.1135*** 0.1123*** 0.1014***
(0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0135)
More than 10 0.1106*** 0.1215*** 0.1197*** 0.0985***
(0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0122)
N 242216 192665 172434 55692
Mean Accuracy on 1st Image 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.74
Mean Accuracy on 10th Image 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.83
R2 0.29 0.20 0.20 0.26
Table 2: Ordinary least squares regression with user and image fixed effects evaluating image position on users’
accuracy in identifying manipulated images. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical
significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence intervals, respectively. All columns include user and image
fixed effects. Column (1) includes all images (2) drops all users who submitted fewer than 10 guesses and
removes all control images where nothing was removed (3) drops all observations where a user has already seen a
particular image (4) keeps only the images qualitatively judged as very high quality.
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Appendix II: Supplementary Information
Figure 5: End-to-end pipeline for targeted object removal following [37,40]
Figure 6: “Erase with AI” User Interfaces
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Figure 7: “Detect Fakes” User Interfaces
Image Uploads
Object Count Order
Person 13450 1
Car 1229 6
Dog 1086 2
Cat 1082 3
Elephant 185 4
Bicycle 158 7
Bird 139 22
Tie 120 31
Airplane 106 13
Stop Sign 99 8
Instagram Directed Crawls
Object Count Order
Person 6944 1
Cat 725 2
Dog 493 3
Elephant 170 4
Car 162 6
Bicycle 71 7
Sheep 52 5
Stop Sign 31 8
Airplane 29 13
Skateboard 25 10
Table 3: Top 10 Target Object Removal Selections for Uploaded Images and Targeted Instagram Crawls on
Deep Angel. Each selection of an Instagram username initiated a targeted crawl of Instagram for the three most
recently uploaded images of the selected user.
Figure 8: Photographic manipulation has long been a tool of fascist governments. On the left, Joseph Stalin is
standing next to Nikolai Yezhov who Stalin later ordered to be executed and disappeared from the photograph.
In the middle, Mao Zedong is standing beside the “Gang of Four” who were arrested a month after Mao’s death
and subsequently erased. On the right, Benito Mussolini strikes a heroic pose on a horse while his trainer holds
the horse steady.
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Figure 9: Heat map of the world showing how many users came from each country. 23% of users are from the
United States of America, 9% from France, 9% from United Kingdom, 6% from Germany, 4% from Spain, 3%
from China, 3% from Canada, 2% from Brazil, 2% from Australia, and 2% from Finland.
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Appendix III: Unanchored Object Conjuring
While posing a risk to information online, these generative AI systems can also offer new possibilities for creative
expression. For example, the Creative Adversarial Network learns art by its styles and generates new art by
deviating from the styles’ norms [42]. Likewise, interactive GANs (iGANS) can augment human creativity for
artistic and design applications [43].
Thus, if objects can be plausibly removed from images, then it is reasonable to imagine objects can be
plausibly generated in an image from which they never existed. As an extension to the Deep Angel pipeline, we
approached adding objects to images using image-to-image translation with conditional adversarial networks [44].
Since these neural networks learn a mapping from an input to an output image, we can train an image-to-image
model using the manipulated images as inputs and the original submissions are outputs. While the model does
not re-appear objects as they were, the model produces resemblances of the missing objects. Images produced
by Deep Angel and AI Spirits (the reversal of Deep Angel) are on display at the online art gallery hosted by
the 2018 NeurIPS Workshop on Machine Learning for Creativity and Design. As large-scale, paired datasets of
creative content (such as the one presented here) become increasingly common, and neural network architectures
for content generation become more powerful, automated object insertion into existing media will become a rich
area for future work.
Model
With image-to-image translation, a latent representation of the structure an image can be efficiently expressed in
and generated for different contexts [43–45]. This latent structure is encode in information like edges, shape, size,
texture, and color that are anchored across contexts. By applying image-to-image translation to the results of
the Target Object Removal pipeline, we force the model to learn both the structural representation for removed
objects and their contextual location. We call this process unanchored object conjuring.
For the unanchored object conjuring extension, the global component (G1) (7× 7 Convolution-InstanceNorm
ReLU layer with 32 filters and stride 1 [46]) in the top right of Figure 10 is first trained on downsampled images,
then local component (G2) is concatenated to G1 and they are jointly trained on full resolution images. We
follow the original pix2pixHD loss function which takes the form
min
G
 max
D1,D2,D3
∑
k=1,2,3
LGAN (G,Dk)
+ λV GGLV GG(G(x), y)
+ λfm ∑
k=1,2,3
Lfm(G,Dk)
where LGAN (·) is adversarial loss [47], Lfm (·) is the feature matching loss pix2pixHD used to stabilize training
and LV GG (·) is the perceptual loss based on VGG features [48,49]. We train the model using the Adam solver
with a learning rate η = 0.0002 for 200 epochs [50]. η is fixed for the first half of training (epochs 0 to 100) and
then η linearly decays to 0 for the second half (epochs 101 to 200). All weights were initialized by sampling from
a Gaussian distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 0.02 [45]. We used a PyTorch implementation with a batch size of 4
on an Nvidia Geforce GTX Titan X with 8 cores.
Data
We filtered all images uploaded to Deep Angel to 5,634 images where people were selected to be removed. We
manually filtered these images to the 1000 best manipulations based on qualitative judgements. Then, we resized
and cropped images to 1024×1024. We trained these images following the pix2pixHD image-to-image translation
architecture, which yields improved photorealism due to its coarse-to-fine generators, multi-scale discrimination
and improved adversarial loss [45]. Figure 10 shows the architecture for this extended pipeline.
This unanchored object conjuring technique can be used to create a new class of art that combine existing
photographs with GAN-style imagery. In addition, the reconstructions provide a technique for interpreting the
model and the underlying dataset by revealing where removed objects systematically appear.
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Figure 10: The top row displays 4 input images and the bottom rows displays the modeled output based on the
unanchored object conjuring pipeline. The images on the left are considered reconstructions because they are
part of the paired training sample and the images on the right are considered creations because they are not
part of the training dataset.
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